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Assuming that there is causality in nature, there are several questions 
related to our possibility of perceiving it. First of all, there is the crucial 
distinction between the mere perception of causality, namely our 
possibility of perceiving that something causes something else to happen 
(Michotte 1963; Duncker 1935), the fact that our experience represents 
causality as a part of perceptual content (Siegel 2009), and the idea that we 
can perceive causality only through a sort of strict analogy with other 
senses (Butterfill 2009)—namely we see some causal interactions in the 
same sense as that in which we can hear speech.1  
With a corpus of about 150 experiments, Michotte (1963) tried to 
demonstrate that adults could perceive that something causes something 
else to happen. Michotte showed that subjects were inclined to describe 
scenes of launching and entraining in causal terms. In launching, an object 
a moves towards a stationary object b and, upon being touched, object b 
immediately begins to move in the same direction as a while a stops. In 
the entraining case, the same thing as in launching happens, but a 
continues to move along b. Michotte uses different kinds of objects in his 
experiments, such as hefty wooden balls, lights and shadows projected 
onto a screen, or a combination of both. Even if subjects knew that no 
causal relations were in force in a significant number of situations, they 
still described the situations shown in causal terms. Michotte’s results 
demonstrate that adults regularly describe launching and entraining in 
causal terms using sentences such as: “The red square moved the blue one 
along,” or “The ball pushed the shadow.” Therefore, Michotte’s 
experiments do not prove that we can genuinely perceive that something 
causes something else to happen, but that we can describe a specific 
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situation in causal terms. To prove that we can perceive causality, we need 
theoretical assumptions about the relationship between experience, beliefs 
and reports. Moreover, Michotte isolated the exact parameters that have to 
be respected in order for subjects to describe an action as causal, such as 
the exact rate at which objects moved, the acceptable delay between the hit 
of object a and the moving of object b, or the dimensions of the objects on 
the screen. Duncker (1935) has also studied the correspondences between 
the properties of causes and of their effects, extrapolating some specific 
parameters that have to be satisfied in order for us to experience causality. 
For example, a sound has to be heard there where an object is seen to 
strike; a sheet of paper acquires a crease where it is folded; fire ensues 
shortly after a match is applied to an object. There are also pronounced 
similarities in content and form between cause and effect. The shape of a 
footprint corresponds to that of a shoe; a hot object transmits heat to its 
surroundings; a wet object moistens things in contact with it. In addition, 
Duncker correlates the accelerated rhythm of the motions of knocking 
parallels to the changing rhythm of the sounds produced. Both Duncker’s 
and Michotte’s reflections are useful for evaluating the correct conditions 
that have to be satisfied in order to experience causality, but that does not 
imply that we can represent or perceive causality.  
Then, another issue related to the theme of causality concerns whether 
there is a method that allows us to discover if we can perceive causality 
and if such a method is applicable to all sense modalities. In what follows, 
I shall consider Siegel’s method of phenomenological contrast as a good 
tool to discover whether a high-level property, such as causality, can be 
perceived. I shall state that the method works not only within the case of 
vision, but also in the specific case of audition.  
1. The contrast method 
The method of contrast is a useful tool in the philosophy of perception 
since, by virtue of the examples upon which it is based, it may help us to 
discover something that is characteristic of perceptual experience. 
Moreover, in order to apply the method correctly, we need to specify the 
features of our intuition of difference upon which the method is grounded. 
As a starting point, it is necessary to establish what the relata 
connected by the relation of causality are. At this stage, I am not 
considering the casual theory of perception as sustained by Lewis (1980), 
Grice (1961), or Armstrong (1968). In their versions of the causal theory, 
they discuss the conditions in which, during the visual experience E of an 
object O, the object O would cause having the experience E. In fact, as in 
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every theory of perception, the causal theory also tries to explain the 
nature of our perceptual states and how these are connected to the world. 
For the causal view, the relata are, on the one hand, my own experience 
and, on the other hand, the object of the world that caused it. In addition, 
since we are within the sphere of auditory perception, what I am not 
considering as relata are sound and its source. I am not going to show 
whether sound sources cause their own sounds and whether we can 
perceive them as causally related, since I think they can be considered as a 
sole event, therefore we cannot perceive them as causally related. The 
relata of the causal relation I shall be taking into account are two different 
sonorous episodes. I shall sustain that the causality we represent is not that 
connecting sound and sound sources within the same sonorous episode, 
but the one linking two different sonorous episodes together. With 
“sonorous episode” I mean a situation in which you have a sound 
produced by a sound source, namely the jiggle of jingling keys or the 
music of Death and the Maiden performed by a string quartet. Hence, I 
shall hold that the causality we perceive is not that connecting sound and 
sound sources within the same sonorous episode, but one linking two 
different sonorous episodes together. 
 The phenomenal contrast method is used to “discover” not only the 
contents of perceptual experiences, i.e. to find out, once a perceptual state 
has somehow acquired a content, which properties (or objects) enter such 
content. It is also used to discover if there is something within the 
perceptual experience that cannot be exhausted by the representational 
content, since it is irreducible—namely a form of qualia or the so-called 
“phenomenal character” of experience. The phenomenal contrast situation 
is composed of a “target experience” and a “contrasting experience,” 
constituting a minimal pair. The constraints on the “target experience” 
should be that: a) it does not differ from the “contrasting experience” in 
any other respect than the tested property; and b) it should clearly contain 
the target property. The method predicts that, if such a contrast were to be 
obtained, then “the experiences contrast phenomenally because one of 
them has the hypothesized content, while the other one does not” (Siegel 
2009, p. 158). The method is based on the analysis of three different kinds 
of situations: 1) a scenario that changes with respect to a specific trait and 
that is perceived in two different ways by the same perceiver; 2) a scenario 
that remains the same and that has been perceived in a different way by 
two perceivers alike in all respects but for a difference; 3) a scenario that 
remains the same and that has been perceived in two different ways by the 
same perceiver. The majority of the applications of the method has been 
based on the first and on the second option. My aim here is to see which 
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among the three options listed above would be the best instance for the 
correct application of the method. 
2. Applications of the method 
An example of the first option is Koksvik’s “cinema screen argument”: 
 
Imagine that you are sitting in a comfortable seat in the middle of a dark 
movie theatre. You are not in pain, you are not hungry or thirsty, and you 
are sitting still. The screen turns a uniform, pleasant green. You stare at the 
screen, concentrating on it. This is the first situation. You relax, closing 
your eyes. When you open them again, the screen is a uniform garish red. 
You stare at it, concentrating on it. This is the second situation. Clearly, the 
characters of your overall phenomenal experiences would be different in 
the two situations. The best explanation for this is that perceiving 
something green makes a different contribution to experience than does 
perceiving something red (Koksvik, forthcoming, p. 6). 
 
Even if Koksvik criticizes the use of the method, the cinema screen 
argument is meant to show that there is a difference in the way in which a 
perceiver could perceive a scenario that remains alike but for a specific 
trait, i.e. the colour of the screen. The idea is that, since the colour of the 
screen changes, the experience will consequently change. Nonetheless, the 
nature of such a difference is not obvious at all; it may change, depending 
on what your theory of perception is.  
An example of the second option is given by Kriegel (2007, p. 125):  
 
Suppose Prosop and Aesop are modal counterparts, living their almost 
indistinguishable lives in two different possible worlds. Everything about 
Prosop and Aesop is the same, and everything that ever happens to them is 
the same—with one exception: Prosop is, but Aesop is not, prosopagnostic. 
And now, on their 21st birthday, Prosop and Aesop are looking tenderly 
into their respective mothers’ eyes. Intuitively, it seems there is a 
difference in what it is like for them to undergo their respective perceptual 
experiences at this moment. There is an element that is phenomenologically 
manifest in Aesop’s experience but not in Prosop’s. This element is the feel 
of recognizing mommy’s face. Therefore, the property of being mommy’s 
face is phenomenologically manifest in Aesop’s perceptual experience.  
 
Aesop and Prosop, with the latter being prosopagnostic, are going to 
perceive the same scenario differently, therefore the example is meant to 
show that a high-level property, such as mommy’s face, is a property that 
can be phenomenologically manifest. In this case, mommy’s face remains 
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constant, while the perceivers differ in a specific trait. Therefore, it seems 
obvious to claim that there is a difference between their experiences 
explicable, in Kriegel’s view, in terms of the representation of a high-level 
property. 
A further example of the second option is Sigel’s synchronic case of 
the perceptual experience of causation (2009, p. 158). The target situation 
is when you open the curtain of your room and allow some light to come 
in. Thus, you have the event of drawing the curtain and the event of the 
increasing the room’s illumination. The contrasting scenario is based on 
the idea that the curtain does not block out any light in the first place since 
it is translucent. Therefore, just as you uncover the window, the sun is let 
in as in the target case, but not simply by virtue of drawing the curtain, 
which is translucent, but because, as the curtain is drawn open, the sun 
comes out from behind a dark cloud. Yet, the uncovering of the window 
causes the room to light up progressively anyway, as the curtain is drawn 
open. Siegel’s example is meant to show that what is phenomenologically 
manifest is the property of causality, a high-level property that will be 
represented in the target experience—where the perceiver represents the 
two events as completely unified—and not in the contrasting experience, 
where, on the contrary, the perceiver would perceive them as distinct. 
There is an element in the scenario that makes it different, namely the 
thickness of the curtain, but Siegel sustains that this feature is not relevant 
to her thesis; hence the perceiver will perceive the two scenarios 
differently. 
I shall propose two examples (a and b) of the third option in which 
there is no change in the scenario, but which are, nonetheless, perceived 
differently by the same perceiver.  
 
Suppose you have never seen a pine tree before and are hired to cut down 
all the pine trees in a grove containing trees of many different sorts. 
Someone points out to you which trees are pine trees. Some weeks pass, 
and your disposition to distinguish the pine trees from the others improves. 
Eventually, you can spot the pine trees immediately: they become visually 
salient to you. Like the recognitional disposition you gain, the salience of 
the trees emerges gradually. Gaining this recognitional disposition is 
reflected in a phenomenological difference between the visual experiences 
had before and those had after the recognitional disposition was fully 
developed (Siegel 2011, p. 132). 
 
In example a) the scenario remains stable, but the perceiver might 
perceive it differently. A person might find herself in two very similar 
situations, so that the capacity of immediately recognizing pine trees is 
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exercised in one but not in the other. Here, the target experience is the 
over-all visual experience one has after learning to recognize pine trees (of 
which the specific visual experience of recognizing a pine tree is part), and 
the contrasting experience is the over-all experience one has before 
learning to recognize pine trees. What is phenomenologically manifest is 
the ability to recognize a pine tree, and this would explain the difference 
between the two experiences. 
Another example of the third option is Siegel’s diachronic case of 
causality perception (example b). Suppose you are playing catch indoors. 
Then, by mistake, the ball lands in a potted plant. You see the ball landing 
and, after that, the lights go out. The ball’s landing in the potted plant does 
not cause the lights to go out and, presumably, you do not believe it does, 
but it seems that the landing of the ball causes the lights to go out. In the 
second case, again, you see the ball landing in the potted plant and the 
lights go out, but we are assuming that in this case you have no feeling that 
the ball’s landing caused the lights to go out. Siegel says that the 
phenomenal difference between the two experiences stems from how we 
perceive the connection of the two events. In the second case, we just see 
two discrete events as occurring in a quick succession, while in the first 
one we perceive them as experientially unified in a way that is not merely 
temporal. Such an experiential unification that we perceive visually is an 
experiential representation of causation. A phenomenological contrast 
argument invokes visually experienced causality as the best way to explain 
the phenomenological difference. 
I listed three different ways of applying the phenomenal contrast 
method. I would say that only the third option is acceptable, since it is the 
only application in which intuition is the basis of the features necessary to 
avoid a massive use of introspection. The method starts from the idea that 
the comparison between two experiences might reveal something new 
about perceptual experience. The method is based on two passages: 1) the 
appeal to introspection, which is necessary in order to build the minimal 
pair argument where the difference appears; 2) the use of arguments in 
order to investigate the nature of that difference and to choose the best 
explanation for it, after having excluded possible alternatives. The second 
passage is based on an inference to the best explanation. In addition, in 
order to avoid misunderstanding, the same label of “phenomenal contrast 
method” has to be substituted with the simpler label of “contrast method,” 
so that the “phenomenal” attribute is not confused with the more technical 
use of the term “phenomenal”: such as phenomenal content, or quale. The 
elimination of “phenomenal” renders the method more impartial; it is a 
guarantee that the method is a neutral tool that is used to discover the 
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property represented in our perceptual experience. The difference that 
holds between the target and the contrasting experiences is a perceptual 
difference. This difference is based on an intuition that constituted the first 
passage of the method and has the specific properties that I am going to 
describe. Among the three available applications of the method listed 
above, I shall state that only the third one—where the scenario remains the 
same but a perceiver perceives it in two different ways—represents a good 
application of the method.  
3. First passage of the method 
Siegel (2006, p. 130) claims that the phenomenal contrast method 
appeals to introspection only indirectly. She admits that it is just the 
starting point of the method, useful to the extent of helping to rule out 
inadequate contents that may be proposed as forming part of the 
experience but, at the same time, it is not a totally reliable tool:  
 
Introspection can rule out many proposed contents as inadequate to the 
phenomenal character of the experience, and thus does not seem to be 
completely useless as a means of finding out which contents an experience 
has. It thus seems to take us some way toward finding out which contents a 
specific experience has. But it does not take us far enough. Both the color-
shape hypothesis and the cherry-content hypothesis seem prima facie 
plausible—neither is obviously phenomenally inadequate. If introspection 
could tell us which of them were correct, then it would tell us directly 
about the phenomenal character and content of experience to a degree of 
precision that would be needed to decide between these hypotheses. And if 
it did that, one of the hypotheses would seem obviously phenomenally 
inadequate. Since it doesn’t, we can conclude that introspection does not 
decide between these hypotheses.  
 
In the above passage, Siegel refers to the impossibility for introspection 
to establish which theory is correct in the case of a contrasting situation. 
For instance, supposing you are looking at a bowl of expertly crafted wax 
cherries, you can affirm either that your visual experience represents the 
colours and shapes of the wax fruits, but does not go so far as representing 
that they are fruits, or that your visual experience represents the being 
property of cherries, and its contents include that there are cherries in the 
bowl. Introspection will not help you to tell which of the two 
representations is correct, so it is a limited tool, limited to the construction 
of the minimal pair of the contrast method. Actually, even if Siegel 
sustains a relative power of introspection, her examples of the application 
of the method, in the pine tree case and in the case of the drawn curtains 
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and room illumination, do not use introspection with parsimony. This 
claim will become clear only after we would have defined the 
requirements of the intuition upon which the first passage of the method is 
based.  
Intuition is part of the first stage of the method and it is required to 
make the minimal pair acceptable, namely to make it evident that there is a 
clear difference between the contrasting and the target experiences. 
Arguments do the further job of deciding the best explanation of that 
difference. In order to be widely accepted, the difference between the two 
experiences has to have two features between which a tension is created: 
the difference has to be immediately evident, and, at the same time, it does 
not have to be easily explicable, it has to be complex and multifaceted. 
The McGurk effect shows how an intuition of a perceptual difference with 
those properties is applied. It is perceptually evident to every normal 
perceiver that the multimodal perception under this illusion would change 
with the two different ways in which the speaker moves his mouth. There 
is a difference in the way the two scenarios are perceived. We need an 
explanation that is not already given in the presentation of the McGurk 
effect. Generally speaking, the immediate evidence will contribute to the 
general agreement on the intuition of the difference; a serious explanation 
of it should avoid assuming that the specific intuition of a difference in 
itself already contains a possible path to follow in order to define the 
nature of that difference. For instance, Jackson’s black and white room is a 
very good example of the use of an intuition of a difference that possesses 
the afore mentioned characteristics (Jackson 1986). Mary, a neuroscientist 
who has all the possible knowledge regarding colours, is forced to live in a 
black and white room her entire life. When she escapes from the room and 
sees a ripe tomato for the first time, she is going to learn something new, 
namely what it is like to see red. Without evaluating the validity of the 
argument, Jackson’s reasoning is based on a very clear, immediately 
evident intuition, such as the fact that there is a difference between Mary’s 
knowledge in and out of the room. It is hard to deny that such a difference 
exists, as it is vividly and unquestionably apparent. Yet, providing an 
explanation of the nature of such a difference is not an easy task,2 and such 
a difficulty is the confirmation of the complex and multifaceted character 
of intuition. If a specific difference in a minimal pair were enough to offer 
a guide for a possible interpretation, the power of argumentation, which is 
central in the second passage of the method, would be enormously 
diminished.  
Kriegel’s method of knowability3 (2007, p. 131) will help to sketch a 
very general picture of the way in which it is possible for us to acquire the 
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intuition of a difference. Kriegel claims that in order for knowledge to be 
phenomenologically manifest, it has to be first-person knowable and, since 
we can have a first-person knowledge of the contents and attitudes of our 
conscious judgements, such contents and attitudes are phenomenologically 
manifest. I do think that the intuition of difference is immediately evident 
only if it is first-person knowable. As in Kriegel’s method, also in my 
analysis of intuition, being phenomenologically manifest and being first-
person knowable are intertwined traits. If the intuition is first-person 
knowable, then it is probably also phenomenologically manifest. With 
“phenomenologically manifest,” I mean what simply appears to constitute 
our perceptual experience. Therefore, I am not using “phenomenologically” 
as a technical term, as if the basic difference that constitutes the starting 
point of the contrast method were already considered a kind of subjective 
property, a quale, or something that is irreducible to the representational 
content. I am using the term in a more neutral way, so that 
“phenomenologically manifest” refers to the status of the intuition which 
has to appear evident to us. The way in which this intuition appears 
evident, or is manifest to us, is through the first-person knowledge. 
Regarding first-person knowledge, I cannot give an exhaustive notion of it 
but, to follow Kriegel’s example, it is possible to define it via the 
difference between first-person knowledge and third-person knowledge:  
 
Consider the fact that I am right now visualizing a smiling kangaroo. Both 
you and I are in possession of knowledge of this fact: we both know what I 
am visualizing. Yet we know this differently. I know it effortlessly, you 
know it effortfully; I know it without the mediation of inference, you know 
it with the mediation of inference; I know it quickly, you know it slowly. 
One may disagree, or be unclear on, one or all of these characterizations of 
the difference between my knowledge and yours. But surely there is a 
difference between the two. However one ends up characterizing the 
difference between my knowledge and your knowledge of the fact that I 
am visualizing a smiling kangaroo, it is clear that I know it one way 
whereas you know it another way. The way I know it we will call “first-
person knowledge”, the way you know it we will call “third-person 
knowledge” (ivi, p. 132).  
 
Being effortless, quick and non-inferential (ivi, p. 133), first-person 
knowledge is what makes intuition immediately evident.  
The second trait of the intuition of difference, namely it being complex 
and multifaceted, would be explained away by the fact that we do not 
possess any immediate plausible explanation of it but, as stated by the 
second passage of the method, the choice of the best explanation has to be 
made through argumentation. 
Chapter Six 
 
88
4. Analysis of the three options based on the first passage 
of the method 
In this paragraph I shall evaluate if the specific intuitions of the 
difference on which the five examples of the method are based respect the 
characteristics I listed, namely immediate evidence and the complexity and 
multifacetedness traits. Therefore, the analysis will concern the first 
passage of the method and will not evaluate if the explanation of each 
example offers sound arguments to purport its validity. This will be tackled 
in the last paragraph of the paper, but only in relation to the property of 
causality. I would claim that example b) of the third option, where the 
scenario remains the same but the perceiver perceives it in two different 
ways, is the best application of the method. But I shall start by analysing 
the other examples.  
The example of the pine tree, instance a) of the third option, is a case in 
which the intuition of difference, even if it is immediately evident, is not 
complex and multifaceted, but in itself it already contains a possible 
explanation. The example was meant to show that it is possible to perceive 
a pine tree as a tree and as a pine tree. The ability to perceive a pine tree as 
pine tree is due to the acquisition of a recognitional disposition that is 
reflected in the phenomenological difference between the visual 
experiences you had before and after the recognitional disposition was 
fully developed. Furthermore, such recognitional disposition might be 
result from a process of learning. Both facts, the idea of recognitional 
disposition and the idea of a process of learning, seem to arise as the most 
spontaneous and immediate explanation of the intuition of difference, as if 
the intuition in itself already contained such an explanation and as if 
introspection alone was sufficient to give such an explanation, like an 
invasive suggestion. We said that in order to limit the use of introspection, 
it would have to be used only as a starting point to construct the target and 
the contrasting case. For instance, in the pine tree example its use is 
pervasive, therefore the example is not a good one. The same kind of 
criticism—the idea that the core intuition already contains its explanation 
so that it is not complex and multifaceted, even if it is immediately 
evident—might be applicable in the other examples, albeit with a small 
difference. In the first example, the cinema screen argument, there is a 
property of the scenario that changes, namely the screen’s colour property, 
and such change corresponds to a difference in the perception of the 
perceiver. It seems that when the argument entails a different scenario 
between the contrast and the target experience, this difference already 
suggests the corresponding difference in terms of the perceiver’s 
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perception. For example, the fact that the cinema screen argument bases its 
intuition of difference on the represented property of the screen would 
contain the explanation of the intuition in itself. As if the changed property 
of the screen was the cause of the difference in perception and, by virtue of 
it being the cause, it also gives the possible explanation of that difference, 
using introspection excessively. As I stated beforehand, introspection has 
to be used only to state the intuition of difference, to present it, without 
giving any additional clue towards the explanation of it. The examples of 
Prosop and Aesop and Siegel’s synchronic argument are not acceptable for 
the same reason for which the cinema screen argument is not acceptable. 
In Prosop and Aesop example, the scenario, that is mommy’s face, 
remains the same. There is no property of the scenario that changes, but 
this is perceived in a different way because of the prosopagnosia of 
Prosop. The two brothers perceive their mother’s face differently, so the 
idea is that the high-property of being a mommy’s face can be represented 
in the content of perceptual experience. Even though the intuition of 
difference is immediate enough here, as in the case of the cinema screen 
argument, the fact that the brothers perceive it objectively in a different 
way would already guide, through introspection, the explanation of such a 
difference. And that explanation, suggested by the stated difference 
between the twins, does not make the intuition complex and multifaceted. 
The stated difference in this case lies not in the scenario’s architecture, but 
on the side of the perceivers.  
At the same time, Siegel’s synchronic example faces the same problem. 
In her example, the scenario changes, since the curtain in the contrasting 
experience is translucent, whereas in the target experience it is not. The 
curtain case is described in such a way that the colour and thickness of the 
curtain differ in the two scenes, and it would be plausible to infer that by 
virtue of this difference there are corresponding differences in the contents 
of experience. Thus, the difference of the scenario would already force one 
to give an explanation, letting intuition lose its complexity and 
multifacetedness. Siegel actually explains the difference in terms of the 
representation of causality—since what is at issue is not the relation 
between the curtain and light in general, where the representation of colour 
and thickness would matter, but the relation between the lighting of the 
room and the uncovering of the window—but, at this stage, her answer is 
not relevant, even if she is right. On the contrary, what matters is the fact 
that the intuition of difference implicitly carries its possible explanation. 
The first characteristic of the intuition of difference, immediate evidence, 
is respected in both Siegel’s and the twin’s examples, since both propose a 
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situation in which the difference of perception between the target and the 
contrasting experience is undoubtedly plausible. 
The example of the ball landing in a potted plant is the ideal 
application of the method of contrast. Both of the necessary features are 
respected. It is likely that we might perceive the landing of a ball in a 
potted plant and the illumination of the room—if the events happen 
without a big temporal gap—either as somehow united, tied, or as two 
distinct and separate events. It is immediately evident that the two events 
could be perceived in two different ways, but we would not find the 
explanation of this difference as immediately as the intuition in itself. And 
this is due to the fact that the scenario remains the same; there are no 
changes in the property represented. In addition, the perceiver is 
constituted by a single person, that is there are no twins with an evident 
difference which might influence the explanation of it. Furthermore, the 
intuition remains complex since there is no visible and obvious 
explanation of it. Therefore, the tensive aspect of the intuition of difference 
is preserved, therefore the use of introspection is confined within a 
legitimate use. 
5. The perception of causality in auditory perception 
Siegel’s case of the ball landing in a potted plant is a good way to 
apply the method of contrast, at least with respect to the first passage of 
the method. The second passage consists in the evaluation of the different 
possible explanations of the intuition of difference, ruling out implausible 
accounts and leaving just the best explanation. Instead of assessing her 
arguments, I shall propose a different example. The idea is to present two 
examples, a synchronic and a diachronic case, which will show that we 
can perceive causality within the sense modality of audition. Therefore, 
my diachronic case will have the same schema as that proposed by Siegel. 
Then, I shall evaluate the best explanation of the intuition of difference, 
and I shall state that the perception of causality is the best answer. I shall 
also present a synchronic case that, on the contrary of Siegel’s, will 
contain the features necessary to intuition. I shall conclude with an 
evaluation of the possible explanations of that last example, arguing that 
we can auditorily perceive causality. 
The diachronic example is the following: suppose you are in a country 
fair and you decide to have a go at the shooting gallery. The task is to 
shoot a gun and try hitting a target in the form of a small iron bell. It is 
possible for a perceiver to hear these two sonorous episodes, the gunshot 
and the bell’s jiggle, in two different ways, either as two unified events, 
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bound by an impression of causality, or as totally separate and distinct 
events. If Siegel’s potted plant example works, at least in the general 
formulation of the example, then, also in our case, we have a clear and 
immediate intuition of a difference between the two experiences, 
excluding an already suggested explanation. Therefore, we may say that 
such intuition is complex and multifaceted.  
Regarding the synchronic case, let us suppose that in the exact moment 
in which you hear a note A produced by a single horn you hear a sound 
produced by a crystal glass that resonates at the same frequency of the 
horn. The idea is that, as in the diachronic case, you might perceive the 
two sonorous episodes as somehow united or totally distinct, and the 
immediacy and the complexity of the intuition of difference is preserved.4 
6. The second passage of the method 
The second passage of the method consists in the evaluation of the 
possible explanations of the difference. My explanation is that the sense of 
unity we experience is due to the perception of causality, but it is possible 
to affirm that what helps us to perceive a certain unity in both cases is a 
form of Husserlian retention. Suppose you hear five sounds: the jingle of 
jiggling keys, the stomping of a foot, the creak of a door, the clink of a cup 
and the rustling of a peace of paper. Husserl (1928) claims that if you 
compare this auditory experience to the experience of a series of five 
sounds as parts of a melody, you would perceive the notes of the melody 
as unified in a way in which the five motley sounds are not perceived, 
even if at each moment you could remember the sounds from the previous 
moments. Husserl’s idea is that in the case of melody, we “retain” the 
previous notes, which is a form of remembering, whereas in the motley 
sound case we do not. The opponent of the causal content thesis would say 
that the difference between the contrasting and the target experiences is 
due to the sense of retention which is present in the target but not in the 
contrasting case. We can reply to this objection by saying that in the 
diachronic case we are talking of motley sounds, not a melody of sounds, 
so that we cannot refer to retention. Also in the synchronic case, even if 
there is a horn which produces the note A, the note is related to the sound 
of the crystal glass through resonance, not melody.  
It is possible to disregard causality by stating either that the impression 
of unity can be explained away by reference to retention and not causality, 
or that we do not experience any sense of unity at all. In addition, the 
difference may be due to non-causal contents. For example, in the 
diachronic case, one would say that there is a time gap between the shot 
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and the bell’s jiggle that varies in the two experiences. And this variation 
is responsible for the difference in their perception. But I am assuming that 
the scenario remains exactly the same, the time gap between the shot and 
the bell’s jiggle also remains stable, so that the difference is not due to this 
non-causal content. The same answer is applicable to other possible non-
causal content explanations, such as the duration property of the respective 
sounds of the gun and the bell in the diachronic case, or the sound volume 
of the horn’s note A and the crystal glass sound.  
 
The contrast method is an excellent strategy that enables us to discover 
that a high-order property, such as causality, can be part of our auditory 
perception. Nevertheless, the intuition of difference has to have specific 
features in order for the method of contrast to be acceptable. Within the 
experience of auditory perception, via a diachronic and a synchronic case, 
it is possible to perceive causality as a relation between two different 
sonorous episodes. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1 I shall not discuss this third option in this paper. 
2 It would be enough to look at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on 
“Qualia: The Knowledge Argument” (Nida-Rümelin 2002) to realize that many 
different explanations of the new knowledge Mary gets out of the room have been 
given, and to verify how Jackson’s intuition of difference is not immediately 
definable, and that, in addition, plenty of arguments are needed to support one 
view or another. 
3 Kriegel considers his method as an alternative to the method of contrast, an 
alternative that does not face the problem of not distinguishing between contingent 
phenomenology and necessary phenomenology. 
4 Siegel aims to show not that we can perceive causality, but that the property of 
causality is part of the representational content of our experience. For her, 
experiential representation of properties or relations is not factive, so you can 
represent that p even if p is not true. In fact, her examples are cases in which there 
is no real causal link between the events, nonetheless the property of causality is 
considered as being represented as a part of the content of experience. In my paper 
I shall not discuss the difference between perceiving and having an experiential 
representation of causality. For this reason, I proposed two cases where the 
sonorous episodes are linked by a real causal relation, so that, at least with regard 
to my examples, I do not have to draw the difference between the auditory 
perception of causality and the experiential representation of it. 
